PFDJ: REDEFINING REALITY IN ERITREA By Biniam Yohannes

Inventing the truth

However untenable the explanations might be, everything about the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) is about redefining reality to fit its purposes. The PFDJ achieves this by initially confusing people and then making them dependent on official versions of reality. Understanding immediate events and situations individually is taboo, as reflected in the government-controlled media’s ‘automatic interviews’, where people are confronted with a microphone at public events and asked to spontaneously repeat their understanding of current party thought.

The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which won the war of independence from Ethiopian colonisation in 1991, had four main branches that helped influence perceptions of reality: the media, the gossip machine, the party cadre and the Revolutionary Guards. The media, which included magazines, periodicals, and the Voice of the Masses radio station, used traditional ‘land-based’ nationalism, historical hatreds and Marxist jargon to create an almost unanimous, unquestioning following among the people. The gossip machine fabricated, distributed, and weighed opinion. The party cadre preached official propaganda to set out the boundaries of thought. The Revolutionary Guards were the punishing hand. 

Understanding that it could not survive in a participatory democracy, the EPLF decided early on to control every aspect of public life. This included directing how people thought, defining events according to the party’s internal plans, discouraging free thought, running the public gossip machine, and monopolising education, media, art and culture. Its premise was that people need to be told what is happening around them and that most people are too lazy to try to discover the truth for themselves; those who stand apart from the receptive majority are few and can always ‘be taken care of’.

'Fah': where the radio started in 1st Jan. 1979

Traditionally, the EPLF, and later the PFDJ, focused more on defining reality than on making it happen on the ground. From the start, its end game was about retaining power rather than liberating the people and the land. The party honed its skills in shaping perceptions in the years following independence, including by forcing definitions and explanations, coercing people with torture, and getting rid of them if they refused to change. This left only those who either were too afraid to express what they felt was the truth or were alive because of their malleable perceptions. Over time, even silent opponents were paralysed by constantly guarding their own thoughts and ended up intellectually dead, repeating the revolutionary mantras in order to stay safe. Others, who were tired of continuously having to reject the constant lies to keep their conscience intact, chose to give up and immerse themselves in carefully supplied ‘revolutionary’ rhetoric, and some even began helping the party weed out other silent dissenters.

Even if the regime understood that Eritrean nationalism was not about its legacy before or after Eritrea’s independence, they had re-stitched reality to appear so. Once these ideas were set in motion, their influence grew exponentially. From its formation in the early 1970s until this day, the EPLF (and now the PFDJ) has always depended heavily on providing a version of reality to be forcefully swallowed by the masses. Even before the use of media, reality was officially defined and anyone who would not adhere to that definition was ‘taken care of’. Taking care of someone meant labelling them anti-revolutionary and detaining and torturing them. If that was not enough to quell their dissent, they were killed or ‘dissolved’.

The first independent Eritrean radio station was setup by the liberation struggle in 1979 and named the ‘Voice of the Masses’, the name by which it is still officially known today. During the armed struggle, this station mainly focused on keeping Eritrean society under one common EPLF leadership. It also helped the EPLF to control social discussion among a society that was becoming increasingly dispersed around the globe. The Information and Culture Bureau, which controlled the radio, produced its own version of Eritrean culture in the form of artistic productions. Art was conventional and never reflected the individual. Posters, dramas, short stories, songs, poetry and other art forms repeated what the media said, was distributed through the media and was sometimes more powerful than the media content itself. The majority of Eritrean youth who joined the struggle in the late 1970s and 1980sremember how the patriotic songs in particular influenced them. Reporting and art reinforced the revolutionary thinking and martyrdom as the ultimate goals of nationalism for an Eritrean.

Even though the radio was the official mouthpiece of the struggle for independence, it was by no means the only, or even the most common, opinion shaping tool. It was more often used to broadcast official views, which were almost never the same as the real views distributed by the cadre and the gossip agents, which were themselves very different from the internal party programme. To this day, the media is only used to make the party look a little more presentable than its true image, but a truer idea of its nature can be found in the cadre propaganda and gossip. The media, the cadre and gossip agents are the finishing touches on a reality roughly carved by the chisels of fear and punishment. As the cadre and the media defined a worldview that borrowed heavily from Soviet and Maoist doctrines, they also helped to empower the gossip machine and the punishment apparatus.

At times the party also ‘took care of’ or ‘dissolved’ its own insiders and fighters who had ideas that were contrary to, or better than, other ideas previously put forth by the core ideological engine. These ideas were seen as a threat, even if they might positively empower the party. The EPLF would not risk allowing what it labelled as ‘non-progressive’, ‘anti-revolutionary bourgeoisie’ or ‘semi-bourgeoisie’ elements to sabotage the ‘struggle of the masses for freedom’. These ‘elements’ included educated liberal thinkers, popular war heroes of the struggle, celebrated artists, and any other personalities who were respected more than the main high-cadre. More often than not, those ideas for which people paid their lives to speak, would later appear within party doctrine and programmes as the leadership’s endless wisdom.

It was considered a scientific fact that the struggle for Eritrea’s independence would not be realised under the leadership of a single organisation ‘if the ignorant masses were left un-enlightened’. However, this seemingly logical statement had the most sinister motives behind it. The party had assumed the position of judge, jury and executioner by making it seem rational that it had the scientific and existential authority to decide who was ignorant and who deserved to die. This official doctrine allowed the party to convert or kill anyone opposed to it, whether it was individuals or huge chunks of society.

In order for the revolution to succeed, the masses had to be conscious, organised and armed. The Propaganda and Agitation Bureau worked hard to enlighten people about its supposedly Marxist ideals and freedom. Ideas and ideologies were mixed together in such a way as to make it impossible for someone to reject one concept without rejecting others. By defining Marxist ideals as the same as equality, progress and freedom, a rejection of Marxism became a rejection of Eritrea’s independence, which was considered treason and punishable by death. For most of the peasant fighters, who had to accept the official line even though the land system had always been communal and there was no gap left for Marxism to fill, thinking beyond the complex revolutionary jargon was full of deadly pitfalls and most never dared to venture beyond the outlined borders of known thought. 

Victory inspired euphoria and narcissism:

In 1991 the Voice of the Masses radio travelled to Asmara with the EPLF. A TV station was set up with the affectionate name Ere for Eritrea, or Ere-TV as people called it in those days. After independence, the Voice of the Masses was replaced by the Eri-TV, with its motto ‘Serving the Truth’.  The Arabic and Tigrinya newspapers, Iritriya Al-Haditha and Hadas Ertra, had names that meant ‘New Eritrea’. These names reflected the euphoria of independence and the increased affection for the country among the people. The public did not mind the heavy focus on programmes that told the people how much the EPLF had done for them during the struggle, and in fact even seemed to enjoy the early post-independence media. The government media, which was loved for no other reason than as a trophy of independence, continued to be followed by the public up to the start of the war with Ethiopia in 1998.

It was usual for people to check the Voice of the Masses radio to confirm what to think about events they were seeing with their own eyes

Many people, in fact a sizeable percentage, had understood the struggle era tactics, but tolerated them because all other choices seemed much more costly. This silent, but non-conformist minority, influenced public opinion in the first few years after independence. Once independence was won, the social commentary machine turned against the EPLF and its leadership. By the early 1990s the party seemed to believe many of the made up truths that it had fed the masses during the struggle. It was drunk on the intoxicant of unexpected victory and thought itself invincible. This was among the many variables that the EPLF miscalculated in its overconfidence, inflated by the unanimous coming together of the Eritrean people for freedom and the defeat of the superpower-backed Ethiopian army. Its first defeat, losing the acceptance of its people, was lost to the improbability of the victory it considered its own making and its own to keep forever.

During the war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, the government media was completely geared to becoming a mouth piece for the government’s propaganda machine. Members of Isaias Afewerki’s inner circle believed that the nation followed them because of their media campaign. As usual, the EPLF/PFDJ believed its own false narrative of having created a love of country among its people. The party’s propaganda virus always had an uncanny way of attacking its inventors and making believers out of the party cadre themselves. During the border war with Ethiopia, which the Eritrean public saw as an attempt by Ethiopia to re-annex Eritrea, popular support for the war effort was high. Eager to take credit for anything good that happened in the country, the leadership believed that they were motivating the people. Eritreans are traditionally fiercely protective of their ancestral land, and this trait has always shaped their history. Their support during the armed struggle was more about the ‘land’ than about the ‘nation’.

The new government-issued reality:

The discrepancies between its own beliefs and the facts on the ground created a fear of losing power among Isaias and his circle. This fear drove the party to become a full dictatorship in 2001. Understanding how badly this was perceived, despite the public’s obedience, the PFDJ decided to employ its struggle era tactics. The party was not done enjoying the perks of power –the adulation, sense of invincibility and millions of dollars. The revolutionary tactics that controlled opinion during the struggle were needed now more than ever to protect the party’s power. Cadre propaganda was launched among the military, PFDJ, government-sponsored associations and civilian ministries. The free press was shut down to give the government media enough space to manoeuvre without challenge.

The media was used by the PFDJ to disseminate government-sanctioned information, not as a total propaganda machine, as making it obvious could create unnecessary and powerful rejection by the audience and allow outside observers to monitor the inner thinking of the party. Hence, the media did not define policy or shape the totality of public opinion, rather, it was a supporting mechanism spewing out uniformed reporting that deafened rather than instructed. It threw at its audience a package that reflected the people’s values as the driving force behind the government’s actions, heavily interspersed with affirmations of the dictatorial line. Its reporting was neither true nor false, but danced around ideas to create a feeling of public consent through the silence that followed the confusion. It instructed the public on what and how to think, by carefully presenting the dictatorial line as public opinion.

Listening to the cadres

However, a small part of the population was immune to the Maoist-style media propaganda. The government understood that it could not rely only on the propaganda machine to ensure total conformity. The gossip machine, which involved intelligence and security elements, was seen as a practical and necessary investment. Designated as ‘03’, the gossip machine allowed for unchallenged dissemination of pre-calculated ideas and information. Unlike the mass targeting of the media, gossip could be tailored to fit the expectations, dreams and fears of specific social groups. All groups in the social strata could be personally influenced by agents who disseminated viral gossip that could not be critically commented on because of its diversity and size. The punishment apparatus, known during the struggle as the Revolutionary Guards, was revived to listen, accuse, induce fear, torture and kill. The army and the intelligence groups competed for control of the Guard and the position of most creative punisher.

Even when things were working in its favour, the party was always looking for groups or individuals to punish. It often took pre-emptive measures to punish individuals and groups that it suspected could evolve into a threat in the future. Although, in many instances, these measures appeared justified when the remaining members of the groups turn out to be against the party, it was usually the pre-emptive punishment itself that turned these people against it.

Having removed all strong political and media opposition and geared up all its struggle era techniques, the party now had a nation and a government at its disposal. About 80% of the nation’s resources were used for defence, and more than 70% of the defence budget is said to have been spent on intelligence gathering against any threats to the regime. When public money was not enough to cover the party’s intelligence expenses, the party lent money to the government so that the government could pay to keep the party in power indefinitely.

As part of these investments, the 03 gossip machine was growing in size to monitor and influence public opinion and smooth the transition to a complete dictatorship. The gossip network disseminated social blackmail against ‘undesirable’ political, business, art or press personalities to convince, or at least confuse, the public, allowing the government to take any action it liked. But the biggest use of the gossip network was to allow people to slowly get used to some horrible idea that the government needed to introduce. This technique decreased public outrage when a plan or idea was introduced by having depleted intellectual opposition through weeks or months of confusing social discussion. If extremely unpopular, ideas could be retracted just to be reintroduced a few years later when there had been enough new national experiences to raise the outrage threshold. 

Government-sponsored troll army:

With the introduction of the Internet, the gossip network found a new and powerful medium. This new medium was anonymous and much easier to control, which made it easier to target groups or individuals. The Internet allowed the PFDJ to take a 20^th century control mechanism into the digital age. Within a short period of time Eritrea had social media trolls, even before the term ‘trolls’ was coined.

In the early 2000s, opposition journalist from outside the country became a headache for the government. Seeing how the Internet was shaping public opinion among diaspora Eritreans, the regime decided to attack online journalist and other opposition through the Internet. Party sympathisers living in the West were hired by the government’s agents to write against any opposition to the government. Some were instructed to set up websites on both opposition and pro-government sides. Those appearing to be on the side of the opposition would gain the public’s trust overtime and then release their disruptive discussions at critical times, as instructed from Asmara. The pro-government websites presented content that could not keep any sane person engaged. They attacked any perceived opposition threat viciously and praised the government more than even the official government media dared to. But, mostly, they served as decoys to keep people from noticing the real party instruments hiding in the opposition camp.

In addition to the hundreds of people who run these websites, hundreds of others work at disrupting discussions on social media. Supplied with blackmailing information against any personalities seen as a threat by their bosses in Asmara, PFDJs troll patrols work day and night to weaken opposition discussions on social media. Facebook and Twitter are full of fulltime trolls, who are handsomely rewarded by the regime in Asmara. Their job is to break up any meaningful discussion on the Internet that might gain positive momentum. They scrutinise posts, study backgrounds for information they can use, exchange information and even hold meetings on how to launch ‘smart’ social blackmail and threat campaigns against the ‘enemy’. They dig into people’s past and present any information that might help to silence individual opposition activists. When evidence against opposition members or other individuals is not available, lies are presented boldly with the help of ugly memes and daring testimonies on social media, aimed at destroying people’s reputations. If such campaigns are not successful, agents, seemingly from the opposition camp, do a more convincing character assassination.

With the resources of the nation behind them, the Eritrean government’s troll patrol is one of the most vicious and best organised troll armies on the Internet. The Eritrean government troll agents have many advantages that separate them from the average troll: they are organised, well paid, and openly and officially vicious in their attacks. Their attacks are persistent and targeted and can tire out most opposition personalities, who cannot dedicate enough time to keep social media followers on their side.

However, many opposition members and human rights activists have persisted, despite years of constant attacks. With the anonymity that the Internet offers the PFDJ’s trolls, it is not easy to pinpoint the originators and take legal action. In contrast, PFDJ sympathisers can easily follow social media activity to look for posts that can be used to launch legal action against Eritreans and Westerners who stand against the Eritrean regime. With the government behind them, agents can easily sue vocal opposition members, activists and media personalities to exhaust their enthusiasm and finances. This is designed to export the PFDJ’s terror and punishment regime to the West to silence opponents and activists, without apparently breaking the laws of the host country.

The fact that Eritrea is not engaged in diplomatic hostilities with any Western nation has been one of the main obstacles in calling attention to what is happening in the country. The absence of diplomatic motivation to remove the regime from power might stem from the country’s relative irrelevance on the world stage. This lack of international concern and diplomatic action has emboldened the government of Eritrea to act even outside its borders to control its people through fear and persecution.