Russia’s Return to the Horn: A New Strategy in the Making?

Tesfalem Habte

The Horn of Africa, as Bereket Habteslassie described it in 1980 was “an arena of uninterrupted armed conflict for nearly two decades” wherein this conflict was “rooted in history and geography, aggravated by outside intervention.” Thirty-four years on, the region is still regrettably plunged in conflict when a day hardly passes without attracting headlines, the sounds of rifles, refugee plights, reciprocal interstate destabilization maneuvers and its (in no way in their consequential order) attendant loss of lives, epidemic diseases, underdevelopment, brain drain and vicious cycle of socio-economic and political vulnerability which in turn involve global interference.

The end of Cold War has caused 25 years of Russian absence in the Horn of Africa as Moscow was concerned with its domestic politics in securing the territories of former Soviet lands. And in what seemed historical irony in light of former Soviet Union’s adverse roles in the region during the Cold War, Mr. Yemane Gebreab, Head of Political Affairs at the PFDJ office in Asmara, appeared to nostalgically concede Russia’s inaction in the region has been dearly missed. The Eritrean delegation further made a visit to Russia twice within four months in 2014.
As a gesture of its new grand strategy in the Horn, Russia dispatched a delegation to Ethiopia in August and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is scheduled to visit Addis Ababa in mid-September aiming, to restore Russia’s presence in the region. But what is in store for Russia and the Horn countries that makes it so imperative at this juncture? The areas of congruence, albeit, with conflicting ends between Russia and the Horn countries without their order of importance, are summarized as: economic, military, geo-strategic and diplomatic interests.

Russia’s Economic Interests in the Horn

The Horn of Africa presents Russia with vast economic potential. During Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union years, the region was noted for its abundance of cheap raw materials such as cotton, cattle hide, honey, grain and meat.

This was in addition to the regions strategic location in the northeast African milieu, proving excellent trade routes between Europe, the Middle East and the rest of Africa. Upon noticing the region’s economic potential, Russian analysts and the Russian Orthodox Mission through their encounter with their Abyssinian counterparts in Jerusalem during the mid-19^th century dubbed Ethiopia as “a country where the cream has yet to be skimmed.”

Gebrewold has written that the Soviet Petroleum Exploration Expedition (SPEE) was engaged in oil exploration in Ethiopia in the 1980s (it drilled nine wells in the region of Callub with an estimated gas reserves of 2.7 trillion cubic feet). The Soviet Union also established commercial relations with Eritrea while it was under the Italian colony. In 1931 for instance, E. Stupak, the then a representative of the Soviet Trade Organization visited Eritrea and expanded its trade relations to Djibouti, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland clearing the way for Soviet exports in the region.

About 30 Russian companies are operating in different regions and sectors in Ethiopia, Russian companies have showed interest in the mining sector in Eritrea and the vast economic potential of Somalia and Djibouti is well recorded by the former Soviet’s Cold War involvement in the region. Such is the economic potential of the Horn that Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the region has been recalibrated in recent years.

Russia’s Weapons Industry and the Horn of Africa

Moscow understands that in order to restore its place in the international system its military industry has to be modernized as Wallander has written that “Russia’s is not a foreign policy driven by economic growth for economic growth’s sake. It is driven by economic growth for the sake of power, autonomy and global recognition.” In a similar vein, Perlo-Freeman and D. Wezeman have documented, that the total arms sales of the Russian companies in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s top 100 grew by 28.4% in real terms in 2012 even though that increase in arms sales is a more reflection of the country’s domestic sales as part of its $700 billion 2011-2020 State Armaments Plan.

For that reason, the military industry is seen as one of the driving forces for the revival of the Russian economy; and given the prevalence of intra and interstate conflicts in the Horn, it makes it appealing for the Russian Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) industry. There is a long history of Russia’s military transfers in the Horn of Africa. During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union gave massive military assistance first, to Somalia then to Ethiopia (Ethiopia was armed by the Soviet Union with military strategists, advisors, pilot fighters against the Eritrea and Somalia after 1978).

During the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrea war, Russian made weapons were, reported to have been used by both the warring parties. The situation becomes even more disturbing when one imagines Russian arms sales to conflict ravaged Somalia, a country regrettably described as the ‘arms capital of Africa’, might end up being at the hands of the wrong actors with such as terrorists. This nonetheless provides Russia with a huge market potential for its arms sales. 
 

 Establishing Voter Constituency in the Horn

If the Soviet Union wrestled with the United States for political and ideological support during the Cold War, Russia is doing the same thing in Africa now. Given the fact that the African Unions’s HQ is located in Addis Ababa, a seat considered by many as the diplomatic gate way to Africa, winning Addis means being in the right track to win the rest of Africa. Such is the importance of the Horn countries in general, and Ethiopia in particular for leveraging a paramount diplomatic stake.

Putin’s visit to Africa in September 2006 is tantamount to what the Forum for the Cooperation of China-Africa is for Sino-Africa relations. In a similar fashion, Russia promised to write off debts, provided humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia and Somalia. This was followed by Lavrov’s visit to the Ethiopian capital, as diplomatic indication of Russia’s interests in the Horn.

And this strategy seems to be mutually reinforcing the two camps’ interests. Russia, being a P5 member can wield its veto power at the United Nations Security Council to provide the desired diplomatic shield to the authoritarian regimes in the region. This has been the case with government of Eritrea as Russia has at times threatened to water-down the United Nations Security Council sanctions put against Eritrea since 2009. Russia has also opposed the report of the UN Monitoring Group in Eritrea and the UN Human Rights Council’s Report on Eritrea in 2014.

This has been reciprocated by Eritrea’s staunch support to Russia’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine as was evidenced during the visit of the Eritrean delegation to the Russian Federation in 2014. However inconsequential this might appear to be, given Eritrea’s position in international relations, it nonetheless, gives a symbolic victory to the Russians at the UN General Assembly wherein the ‘one country one vote’ principle is the rule.

Ethiopia, a country with questionable democratic credentials, would also welcome the opportunity to play the ‘tripartite card’, involving the West, China and Russia. Also, reminiscence of the post-election violent crackdown against demonstrators and human rights activists in 2005, followed by rhetoric criticisms from the West gives the country an imperative to look to Russia for a possible patron in view of the upcoming elections in 2015.

Checkmating the Western Camp and China

  During the 19^th Russian governments were using strategic location of the Horn of Africa as a bulwark against Anglo-French influences (Tsarist Russia) before the Bolsheviks withdrew to the strategy of ‘undermining imperialism from the rear’, a strategy that was applied by establishing a network of diplomatic missions in the region to offset the West’s influence. In later decades, the Soviet Union made the region a battle ground for proxy wars during the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, Russia might have been left in the background in terms of its global reach and influence. This feeling of ‘left-behind’ feeds into Moscow, a strategic expediency to catch up with its erstwhile competitors for a foothold (you might wish to call it toehold, given the region’s size) in the region. By re-establishing Russia’s presence in the Horn, therefore, Putin seems planning not to leave the United States and its allies and China an unchecked space to augment their credentials as potential trade, investment and security partners in the Horn.

If the history of Tsarist Russia and former Soviet Union involvement in the Horn has never been without its ambivalent positions that fluctuate with its geo-strategic calculus vis-à-vis the Anglo-French positions and latter with that of the United States and China rather than protecting the interests of the peoples of the Horn, it is with great caution that the governments in the region should approach the second-coming of Russia. After all, if Russia is a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” as Sir. Winston Churchill once described it, it is important that people take Russia’s return with prudence.

Notes

  [1]. Habte Slassie, Bereket. Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).

 [2]. G. Patman, Robert, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

 [3]. Eritrea and Russia to Boost Trade and Political Ties. Madote(18/02/2014), available at http://www.madote.com/2014/02/eritrea-and-russia-to-boost-trade-and.html (Accessed, 07/09/2014).

[4]. Eritrean Delegation Visited Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. TesfaNews (12/06/2014), available at http://www.tesfanews.net/eritrean-delegation-visited-abkhazia-south-ossetia-and-crimea/ (Accessed, 07/09/2014).

[5]. Gebrewold, Belachew, Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflicts and violence in Africa, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009).

[6]. Perlo-Freeman Sam and D. Wazenman Pieter, “The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies, 2012,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, (January, 2014).

[7]. ሩስያ፡ ሓድሽ ስትራተጂ ኣብ ቀርኒ ኣፍሪቃ. Radio Erythree international (ERENA) (25/08/2014), available at http://erena.org/zena/natl/802-ሩስያ፣-ሓድሽ-ስትራቴጂ-ኣብ-ቀርኒ-ኣፍሪቃ (Accessed, 27/08/2014).